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Note on Sources 
 
i/j and u/v have been silently corrected in quotations from Renaissance sources. 
Capitalisation and punctuation have been retained. Publication dates are as given in the text, 
except the new year is silently corrected to the 1
st
 January.   
 
Introduction 
 
Disability is a categorisation of human difference that is both highly historically 
specific and transhistorically observable. It is both socially constructed and rooted in the 
physical conditions of the real. The challenge for historical disability studies, therefore, is to 
maintain a stable object of inquiry whilst also doing justice to the unavoidable alterity of its 
manifestations in the past. This collection of essays, furthermore, deals with a range of 
contexts and cultures that, although they fit into a fairly narrowly-defined notion of the 
European Renaissance (dated approximately 1450-1650), vary considerably. Even within 
these parameters, the examples and patterns discussed cannot be made to cohere into a 
singular model of ‘disability in the Renaissance’. Instead, this book offers evidence of the 
possibilities for disability that existed in the European Renaissance: configurations of bodies, 
minds and collectives that have left evidence of some of the ways that normativity and its 
challengers interacted in the past.  
Fiona Kumari Campbell’s definition of ableism is a useful starting point for this 
purpose because of its flexibility. According to Campbell, ableism is 
 
a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self 
and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as the perfect, species-typical and 
therefore essential and fully human (Campbell quoted in Shakespeare, 51) 
 
Embedded in this statement is an outline of the process of transition whereby ideas about 
what human beings could be become ideals about what they should be, and eventually 
standards of what they are. To explore whether and how such networks might be found to 
have operated in the Renaissance, and what kinds of self and body they might have produced, 
we need look no further than the iconic image of the Vitruvian Man, sketched in a notebook 
by Leonardo da Vinci in around 1490. 
 
[Figure 0.1] 
 
The figure is drawn in several positions overlaid on top of each other, creating a multi-limbed 
man whose fingertips and toes touch the circumference of a circle and the borders of a square 
that are also carefully traced onto the paper. These geometrical sketches demonstrate the ideal 
proportions of the human body, as outlined by the Roman author and architect, Vitruvius. 
Despite its somewhat surreal doubling of limbs, Leonardo’s Vitruvian Man does seem to 
depict a ‘corporeal standard.’ An emblem of Renaissance humanism, the image is described 
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by Rosi Braidotti (2013) as “an ideal of bodily perfection which, in keeping with the classical 
dictum mens sana in corpore sano, doubles up as a set of mental, discursive and spiritual 
values” (13). As such, she considers it a “basic unit of reference” for what constitutes the 
‘human’ (143), and one which establishes the parameters for the development of liberal 
humanism in the Enlightenment three centuries later.  
Although from our perspective, the image may remind us of subsequent philosophical 
and social movements, it also looks back to earlier ones. The image’s proportionality is an 
example of the Renaissance interest in Pythagorean number mysticism and the burgeoning 
revival of Neoplatonic philosophy, pioneered by Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola in 
fifteenth-century Florence. Leonardo’s drawing envisages the human body as a microcosmic 
emblem of macrocosmic proportionality, demonstrating that mathematical ratios can be used 
to express the structuring principles of the universe. These ratios, by their very nature, could 
be applied at all scales and levels, from human bodies or musical instruments, to planetary 
orbits and the entire cosmos, as envisaged in Plato’s Timaeus (Jowett 1953, 721-22). As such, 
the image represents an idealised symbol of the form of humanity, not necessarily a depiction 
of human normativity.  
Yet Braidotti is right to point out the assumptions the image implies. To start with, the 
depiction of a naked male body as representative of the human form unavoidably signals 
particular gendered and sexed categorisations as an obvious norm, alongside further implied 
characteristics of physical agility and ability to stand as visible physical signifiers of human 
capability, along with relative hairlessness and visible muscularity as markers of aesthetic 
desirability. Whether the person depicted in the image is purely imaginary or, as has been 
suggested, a self-portrait (Nicholl 2004, 247), the specific qualities of this individual create 
normative expectations when they are incorporated into this image of “the human”. 
Furthermore, such idealised forms are the aspiration to which physical and real forms reach. 
The more like its ideal form an object is, the more perfect and more preferable. The Vitruvian 
Man has thus functioned for centuries as a symbol of both an idealised form (and thus one 
which is de facto unattainable), and of standard assumptions about actual human forms and 
their normative qualities. 
The creator of this image, Leonardo da Vinci, can also be made to figure a range of 
contradictory notions about human nature. One of the archetypal geniuses of Renaissance art, 
he was also illegitimate, left-handed, vegetarian (at least in later life) and would probably be 
considered gay according to modern categorisations, all characteristics that depart from 
several of the assumed human norms of his society (Nichol 2004, 58, 43, 18, 11). Leonardo 
also regularly features in lists of famous and successful people with dyslexia in popular 
media,
1
 and is routinely cited as dyslexic in academic papers (e.g. Brunswick et al). This is 
regardless of the potential ethical and logistical problems with retrospectively diagnosing 
historical individuals with learning disabilities (Adelman and Adelman 1987. See also Aaron, 
Phillips, and Larsen 1988). Different elements of Leonardo’s reputation and identity have 
received differing levels of emphasis over time. During the nineteenth century, he was 
                                                 
1
 Such lists often appear on the websites of companies offering educational assessments and tuition. See, for 
example the Davis Dyslexia Association International (https://www.dyslexia.com/about-dyslexia/dyslexic-
achievers/all-achievers/) and the Helen Arkell Dyslexia Centre (https://www.helenarkell.org.uk/about-
dyslexia/famous-dyslexics.php)  
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invoked as one of the quintessential figures of the newly-named ‘Renaissance’, and his 
combination of scientific and artistic interests made him the original ‘Renaissance Man’ 
(Barrie 1979, Burckhardt 1990, 104).  
Combining these various aspects of his life, Leonardo could easily be constructed as 
an example of the “supercrip”, an unrealistic ideal who denies or ‘overcomes’ any limiting 
social oppression (Schalk 2016), his superlative talent winning out over any barriers he might 
have experienced. But such narrativising only serves to fit Leonardo into another kind of 
model, and elides the impact of difference on life in the Renaissance rather than elucidating 
it. Both Leonardo’s work and his life thus demonstrate the way that the Renaissance period 
can be used to reify and naturalise particular ideals of the human body and mind, based on 
later re-writings of the period and projections of later cultural standards back onto the past, 
finding origins where there are perhaps only similarities. Instead, discussion of how disability 
might have been experienced and understood historically must be placed within an 
understanding of the contexts which shaped it.  
 
Renaissance contexts 
 
It is important, therefore, to highlight a number of philosophical and ideological 
frameworks that dominated European Renaissance thought and culture, and which must 
inform our reading of individuals and phenomena from the past. The humoural conception of 
the body and its functions; a providential understanding of the body, its shaping, and its 
power to reveal (or shape) human behaviour; and advances in medicinal science, particularly 
surgery provided the intellectual frameworks by which Renaissance thinkers understood able 
and disabled bodies and minds. 
The idea that the body was composed of humours was part of a conceptualisation of 
natural balance derived from the ancient Greeks. Just as the elements of creation (earth, air, 
fire and water) were balanced and synchronous, so too was the composition of natural 
substances (including the human body) by blood, bile, phlegm and water. The cause of 
disease was understood to be the imbalance of humours, or of their moving inappropriately 
within the body. Hippocrates, debunking the myth that epilepsy was caused by the Gods (and 
hence known as the sacred disease), argued that it had the same humoural cause as any other 
disease: 
 
All these symptoms he endures when the cold phlegm passes into the warm blood, for 
it congeals and stops the blood. And if the deflexion be copious and thick, it 
immediately proves fatal to him, for by its cold it prevails over the blood and congeals 
it (Hippocrates, 362) 
 
Hippocrates’ model of illness was an imbalance, or more precisely a mis-positioning, of the 
humoural liquids within the body. The idea of humours persisted into the early modern period 
primarily through the work of writers like Avicenna, who combined the texts of authorities 
such as Hippocrates, Galen, Aristotle and others into authoritative medicinal compendia. 
Upsetting the balance or coordination between the humours was thought to be the way in 
which God acted upon the human body, a viewpoint which combined Hippocrates’ 
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rudimentary understanding of bodily and dietary health with a providentialist view of disease 
and recovery. 
The bodily humours were generally understood in the early modern period to be 
phlegm, blood, black bile and yellow bile, which might be expressed or manifested within the 
oppositional pairs of hot/cool and moist/dry. These in turn gave rise to personalities such as 
phlegmatic, melancholic, and choleric (angry), which could be modified or balanced by the 
correct diet or environment. The humours, and the humoural body, were “thus employed with 
a wide range of meanings. It could signify material states, qualities, or individual dispositions 
that were the result of an inherent composition of the body influenced by its environment” 
(Orland, 444-5).  
The understanding of health and vitality through the humours led naturally to 
analogical reasoning, whether in similarities or opposites. If something was caused by an 
overabundance of heat and dryness, then cool and moist foods such as lettuce were required; 
alternatively, an imbalance could be adjusted by matching foods to the weaker humour to 
strengthen it within the body. Beyond the need for a balancing diet, humours were a key part 
of consumption and digestion; food was broken down by the stomach into a basic state 
(chyle) which was then “transported to the liver and there concocted (literally, “cooked”) into 
blood, the two biles, and phlegm” (Siraisi, 106). Blood was a humour in its ‘pure’ state, but in 
fact blood in the body was generally made up of blood combined with the other humours in 
various proportions, the mixture of this was carried around the body to nourish its organs. So 
the body was literally composed of humours, and consequently perceived to be generally 
‘liquid’ (that is, composed of fluids working alongside and within porous and changeable 
solids), allowing almost everywhere within it the mixture of substances which gave rise to 
complex emotional or physical states. 
The humoural balance differed between adults naturally, hence the variety in 
temperament, but was also explained by geographic, cultural, social or physiological 
difference. People from different countries had a different makeup of humours, as did men 
and women. Indeed, the difference between men and women was explained by humours 
present from conception: “heat and dryness made men, cold and wet made women” (Gowing, 
7).  
Humours were also important in the development of children: “children’s uniqueness 
resided in their humours – their bodies and minds were warm, soft and weak, abounding in 
the humour blood” (Newton, 221). The balance of humours thus naturally changed over time, 
with the warm and moist humours of children gradually cooling and drying as they reached 
‘temperate’ adulthood and continuing into ‘melancholic’ old age. This humoural model of the 
normative life course provided a framework for understanding and pathologising bodies and 
minds that frequently recurs as the basis for medical and social attitudes in the period. 
 
Providence & religion 
 
Another concept that shaped attitudes towards disability in the period was the notion 
of Providence: the idea that God’s foreknowledge gives all things purpose, including 
apparently adverse events or undesirable conditions. Some forms of disability, particularly 
physical disability, came under this categorisation in the period. Physical disability in 
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Renaissance Europe, particularly those disabilities arising from birth or appearing in 
childhood, was generally permanent, and often highly visible. For this reason, although the 
term ‘disabled’ was available, it was generally used by early modern writers in the sense of 
‘barred from’ or as an incapacity (whether general or specific) to perform a particular task or 
function, rather than in any medical sense. For that, early moderns used ‘deformed’, and its 
cognates, emphasising the physicality of the non-normative body (Davis 2002, 52; Wilson 
2017). Moreover, since God had ordained all things, ‘monstrous births’ became signs either 
of extraordinary events to come, or of moral failings in their parents or the populace more 
generally (French, 2016: 145-6; Bates 2005). The same providentialism meant that those with 
non-normative bodies were often assumed to have ‘deformed’ minds, either in intelligence or 
in morality.  
Though widespread, such a belief was not universal. In his Book of the Courtier, 
Baldassare Castiglione is interested in the perfecting of necessary qualities such as virtue, wit 
and reason. The question of how far such perfecting is possible, and what ‘raw materials’ are 
necessary for the work runs through the text with a certain amount of anxiety, as he considers 
at length the relationship between nature and nurture (what might be termed fashioning and 
self-fashioning). Castiglione reflects on the fact that nature does not distribute her gifts 
evenly: 
 
Truth it is, whether it be through the favour of the starres or of nature, some there are 
borne endowed wyth suche graces, that they seeme not to have bene borne, but rather 
facioned with the verye hande of some God, and abounde in all goodnesse bothe of 
bodye and mynde. As againe we see some so unapte and dull, that a man wyl not 
beleve, but nature hath brought them into the worlde for a spite and mockerie. (Hoby 
1561: C2v-C3r) 
 
Castiglione’s understanding of human variation draws on ideas of providentialism. The 
anthropomorphising of nature and God (or nature through God) allows for a sense of 
intentional distribution of positive and negative physical and mental capacities amongst the 
human population. Such ‘graces’ are based on divine favour (presumably, given the nexus of 
stars, God, nature, and fate) in anticipation of particular behaviour, though Castiglione leaves 
open the possibility of an alternative reading: that the ‘goodnesse both of bodye and mynde’ 
is the cause, not result, of good actions, since they are most capable of performing the type of 
good actions he is modelling.  
Later in his text, Castiglione notes that the fear of being perceived as being judged by 
God, or otherwise morally lacking, causes people to hide their disabilities: 
 
Therfore doeth ech man seeke to cover the defaultes of nature, aswell in the minde, as 
also in the bodie: the which is to be seene in the blinde, lame, crooked and other 
mayned and deformed creatures. For although these imperfections may be layed to 
nature, yet doeth it greeve ech man to have them in him self: bicause it seemeth by the 
testimonie of the self same nature that a man hath that default or blemishe (as it were) 
for a patent and token of his ill inclination. (Hoby 1561: Dn3v-Dn4r) 
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Castiglione is actually interested not in the ‘defaultes of nature’ per se, but in the social 
consequences of belief around the body. These apparent defects are only important in so far 
as they change the opinion of other members of the court; those perceived to be ‘imperfect’ in 
body may be unfairly pre-judged by those around them. In fact, as the passage goes on to 
clarify, Castiglione is explicitly rejecting a fully providentialist model:  
 
Therfore in case vertues were as natural to vs, as heavinesse to the stone, we shoulde 
never accustome our selves to vice. Nor yet are vices naturall in this sort, for then 
shoulde we never be vertuous (Hoby 1561: Dn4v) 
 
For Castiglione, then, virtue and vice coexist in human nature, and in fact it is learning, good 
society and self-reflection, not the state of the body, which make someone virtuous. As with 
Montaigne and Bacon (discussed below), while the state of the body may provide some basis 
for behaviour – not least through an ability to perform particular tasks – the link is not 
predetermined. Individuals must take responsibility for fashioning themselves, regardless of 
their gifts or difficulties, into virtuous individuals. Though this was by no means a universal 
opinion – the providentialist model persisted through the Renaissance – it demonstrates the 
range of thinking about the disabled body which was available in the period.  
 
Medical and scientific developments 
 
It should be no surprise, then, that early modern medicinal science took account of disability, 
and in particular ways to ‘overcome’ physical impairment, usually expressed in the language 
of supplying a defect. Harry Berger has demonstrated the way this logic persists in “the 
medical and graphic surgeries that mediate the passage from the natural to the idealized 
body” (115). These are the medical analogies of the self-fashioning in Castiglione, a way of 
modelling and then improving upon nature’s work. The categories of ‘natural’ and ‘ideal’ 
reveal the way in which the ‘natural’ body is in fact the ‘defective’ body, requiring all 
manner of prostheses to function well. 
Early humanists tended to celebrate the technological ingenuity which allowed 
humanity not just to supply defects but to extend the potential of the body. Berger offers the 
example of the camera obscura in which the “increase and refinement of visual power is 
consequent on its being freed, alienated, from the limits of the body” (105). Thus, even the 
normative body requires technological improvement, especially for specific skills or in fields 
of particular expertise (painting, in this case). 
Andreas Vesalius, a lecturer in anatomy at the University of Padua, is generally 
acknowledged as the founder of Renaissance anatomical studies. His 1543 treatise De 
Humani Corporis Fabrica (‘On the Fabric of the Human Body’) subjected the classical 
models of bodily function (such as the humoural and Galenic models) to scrutiny via surgery 
and dissection. The Fabrica details with precision the functions of the organ, brain and 
muscles, as well as the bone structure of the human body, accompanied by detailed drawings 
for students of anatomy. The following year, when Vesalius performed a public dissection of 
a “hunchback girl who had died of pneumonia” in Pisa, the number of people wanting to 
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attend meant a public holiday had to be declared, and a local surgeon was injured when he 
fell from the top of the anatomical theatre (Catani & Sandrone 2015: 32). 
Followers of Vesalius – including Ambroise Paré, discussed in more detail in Haydon 
and Smith’s chapter – spread his ideas on anatomy and surgery. New instruments were 
developed for surgery, with a particular practical focus on battlefield injuries. The practice of 
reconstructive surgery began in Italy with the work of Gaspare Tagliacozzi, whose work with 
replacement noses, lips and ears was detailed in his 1597 volume De Curtorum Chirurgia per 
insitionem. Tagliacozzi seems to have achieved solid results with his methodology, and it 
found disciples across Europe, with editions of the work being pirated in Italy and printed 
(legitimately) in Frankfurt for wider distribution (Tomba et al., 447). The work was dedicated 
to Vincenzo I Gonzaga, the Duke of Mantua, whom Tagliacozzi had treated for an 
unspecified topical problem with his nose in 1586. Vincenzo was “one of the first 
Renaissance rulers to abide by the politics of compassion” (Finucci, 66); that is, he showed a 
sustained interest in the health and welfare of subordinates, prioritising the treatment of 
wounded soldiers during warfare by supporting camp doctors. Thus, supporting Tagliacozzi’s 
work was a natural political as well as personal choice. The co-ordination between the two 
men also gestures towards the development of personal scientific and political networks 
devoted to the development of medicine, especially those treatments designed to eliminate or 
ameliorate disability, disfigurement and disease. 
Tagliacozzi’s description of his method of skin grafting was translated into English by 
Alexander Read, and published posthumously in 1687 as part of a larger treatise on the art 
and practice of surgery (“chirugery”). The translation focuses on Tagliacozzi’s method, 
noting that while classical authors had the idea for grafting, they give instruction “so 
ambiguously, that he, who upon their credit should undertake the reparation of any of these 
lost parts, would lose his own; and perhaps the Patient his life” (Read 1687: 646). Read, by 
contrast, offers specific instruction, drawn from his own experience and practice, to achieve 
the best results for the patient: 
 
The only part to supply the Nose and Lips, is the Arm above the Elbow; and to supply 
the Ears, the Skin behind the Ears. For neither disfigures a Man, since the Arm is 
covered with Clothes, and the new Ear does indifferently well cover the place behind 
it, whence it was taken. (1687: 647) 
 
The location of the graft was crucial, as Read made clear, because only a similar sort of skin 
would take successfully. In fact, in order for the skin from the arm to be successfully grafted 
to the face, the patient had to remain in a sort of frame to hold the upper arm stationary across 
the face for three weeks. There is, then, a balance of addition and subtraction within the body, 
with a defect not being fully resolved, but simply shifted to a less visible place. The nature of 
the disability here, therefore, is not so much the lack of the body part but the prominence of 
that lack.  
As well as disfigurements from warfare, the replacement of noses in particular was of 
value to those suffering from venereal disease, especially syphilis. Soldiers, of course, were 
particularly vulnerable to these diseases, being highly mobile, away from civil society, and 
presented with opportunities to solicit sex either from sex workers or locals wherever they 
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were camped. The fact that syphilis was so visible (in the ‘saddle nose’) and carried such 
social stigma, led to the development of high quality prosthetic noses in early modern Europe  
 
[Figure 0.2] 
 
Nasal disfigurement consequently figured highly in political satire and popular jest. Marcus 
Nevitt has teased out the ways in which the cavalier poet William Davenant’s nose, lost to 
syphilis, was reimagined in poetry, from Hester Pulter’s warning against his “perilous 
vulnerability to desire” (2009: 288), to John Denham’s attempt to shame Davenant over his 
poor military service by making him and his book (Gondibert) “aggregates of detachable bits 
and incomplete pieces” (2009: 295). The reduction of Davenant’s identity to a missing part 
creates a corporeal identity figured around absence, fitted to a personal identity similarly 
defined by absences (from the battlefield, the Royalist cause, or social status) and 
reconfiguration. 
The breaking and refiguring of bodies had parallel development in Renaissance art 
and science. The poetic blazon broke the (generally female) body into its constituent parts, 
reimagining them as “a collection of passive, inanimate things, like jewels or flowers” 
(Hammons 2010: 124) to be admired, collected or owned. In science, too, anatomists were 
questioning the nature of the human body; if it was not a perfectly unified representation or 
microcosm of God’s perfect universe, then “what were the units out of which the body was 
composed, and into which it could be divided and subdivided?” (Sawday 1995: 96) These 
traditions coalesced in artistically sophisticated anatomy books, whose flaps could be opened 
to reveal the veins, organs and other internal workings of the body. The increased interest in 
the workings of the body led to surgical and prosthetic advancements, but did little to alter 
the image of the perfectly functioning body which circulated in Renaissance Europe. 
Physical defects, then, had a certain logic of visibility which established a need and a 
priority in their treatment, but what about mental illness? Unlike physical disability, it was 
thought perfectly possible to be temporarily out of one’s wits. Hamlet’s “antic disposition” 
(Greenblatt et al 1997, I.v.172) is somewhere between a performance and an extreme form of 
melancholy, but is in any case resolved when the truth about Claudius is revealed (or at least 
once Hamlet believes he knows the truth). Likewise, the Orlando Furioso details Orlando’s 
madness, which is proved to be temporary once Astolfo rides to the moon on a chariot and 
returns with Orlando’s wits in a flask. Astolfo actually finds a large quantity of flasks on the 
moon, including his own, and for those he believed to be complete fools; from this he 
concludes that even those who seem to have no mental faculties on earth are potentially 
curable or able, if only their wits could be somehow restored. 
The work of pioneers such as Paré and Tagliacozzi tend to be regarded as early 
iterations of modern practice but C F Goodey has argued that early medical texts which dealt 
with what we might now term intellectual disability did so in ways that are not especially 
compatible with modern understanding (and are certainly not early versions of the same kind 
of science). Felix Platter (or Plater) was an anatomical professor and pathologist at Basle, 
who produced a student-friendly edition of Vesalius’ Fabrica in 1583. His larger work, 
Observationum: In Hominis Affectibus Plerisque, Corpori et Animo, focuses on injuries to the 
brain, which may come from physical injuries to the head or eye, but also (by a parallel to 
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other underdeveloped parts of the body) via idleness or over-use of the brain. These, as well 
as childhood, old age or hereditary weaknesses, are the causes of intellectual disability, which 
Goodey argues should most appropriately be termed ‘foolishness’, since it sits “at the same 
taxonomic level as conditions we would hardly group with intellectual disability: 
drunkenness, hypochondria, excess emotion, melancholy, mania, demonic possession, 
hydrophobia and frenzy” (298). Whatever the cause of the decline of mental faculties, Platter 
is able to confidently suggest a cure – and even those causes which he accepts cannot 
ultimately be fully cured, especially hereditary problems, social status or old age, can, he 
suggests, nonetheless be greatly improved by his exercises. Between these models of mental 
illness, and the developments in reconstructive surgery, it is clear that some paradigms of 
what we would recognise as “disability” were in circulation in cultural and medical practice. 
 
Theorising disability 
It is an essential premise of this volume that “‘Disability’ was indeed an operational 
identity category in the English Renaissance” as Hobgood and Wood state (2013, 7), even if 
its meanings are significantly different from our own. Hobgood and Wood are responding 
here to Lennard Davis’s location of the origins of disability, as we understand it now, in the 
18
th
 century, saying that before this point 
 
Although there may have been a great number of people with disabilities, one must, 
however, assume that disability was not an operative category (50-1). 
 
It is true that the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries saw the origination of many of the institutionalising 
aspects of disability as a social category. These include the founding of philanthropic 
societies, charities, medical organisations and governmental mechanisms that systematised 
approaches to social issues more thoroughly and consistently than in earlier periods. Davis 
argues that a relatively large proportion of those “with differences in visual, auditory, or 
mobile ability can be incorporated into a preindustrial society” (Davis 2002, 50-1). That is, 
without the essentialising and universalising logic of the factory, labour conditions and 
expected output are more flexible, and more able to account for those who would be deemed 
‘unproductive’ under more rigid working conditions. As Haydon and Smith show in chapter 
3, corporations played a significant role in adjusting conditions to allow continued service. 
Similarly, even if Leonardo da Vinci was indeed dyslexic, it is debatable whether that was 
functionally a disability in his social context, given that large parts of the population were 
unable to read anyway. Bianca Frohne’s chapter demonstrates the ways in which reading, or 
the inability to read, might be negotiated in the context of disability. These questions about 
the relationship between individual body-minds
2
 and their social contexts bring us to a key 
philosophical crux in disability studies.  
Davis’s formulation quoted above establishes a distinction between ‘people with 
disabilities’ on the one hand, and ‘disability’ as an abstract noun on the other. More usually, 
this distinction is expressed using the term ‘impairment’ in contrast with the term ‘disability’ 
to denote a division between the conditions of experience and the ideological constructions 
                                                 
2
 Eli Clare briefly discusses the configurations of terminology relating to body-mind and dualism (2017, xvi). 
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through which we interpret them. This distinction between ideas and bodies, between theory 
and practice, between conceptualisations and corporeality, and the relations between and 
within these binary categories is at the heart of recent debates about how we define disability. 
Davis puts it this way: 
 
Impairment is the physical fact of lacking an arm or a leg. Disability is the social 
process that turns an impairment into a negative by creating barriers to access (12). 
 
This distinction establishes the terms required for the “social model of disability”, a way of 
understanding disability as a form of social oppression, which grew out of disability activism 
in the 1970s (Thomas 2002, 39). As Thomas notes, this way of understanding disability 
considers any disadvantage to be caused by “the social relationships between the impaired 
and the non-impaired, rather than as caused by impairment per se” (40). By refocusing 
attention on the disabling environment, this model enables activists to challenge assumptions 
and practices that restrict access to participation in society. 
The social model has attracted criticism for both essentialising impairment, and 
potentially ignoring it. Abberley, for example, points out that impairment itself is “not 
‘natural’ but an historically changing category” (61). If, as Judith Butler suggests, there is no 
“prediscursive anatomical facticity” that is not always already mediated through ideology, the 
“physical fact” Davis invokes will have different meanings in different contexts.  On the 
other hand, Tom Shakespeare argues that the social model’s insistence that disability is 
caused by context and not impairment risks ignoring the lived experience of disabled people 
(Shakespeare 2014). Shakespeare argues that impairment itself can still be understood as 
restrictive in some ways, independently of social attitudes. He highlights the utopian thinking 
that characterises barrier-free social ideals, arguing that, when probed, models of a barrier-
free world still exclude people with particular kinds of impairments. Historical disability 
studies can contribute to this discussion by offering instructive comparisons that are neither 
utopian nor dystopian, but based in social structures which have existed and can thus be 
tested. These are observable in literature, as well as the medicinal texts described above, or 
the family, corporate, and legal records discussed in the chapters of this volume.  
The social model is only one way of understanding disability, of course. It is common 
practice in introducing work in historical disability studies to outline a range of different 
models as a way of tracing the development of thinking about disability (e.g. Iyengar 2015; 
Hobgood and Wood 2013). Usually, this includes discussion of the way that the social model 
of disability challenged and displaced the ‘medical model’ of disability. Certainly, in terms of 
disability studies itself, the development of the distinction between the medical and social 
models is a fundamental starting point for the discipline. The medical model denotes a way of 
thinking about disability that locates the restrictions of disability within the individual, and 
presents impairment as a target for medical intervention in order to cure the individual and 
thus create or restore normality. If cure is unavailable, then as Thomas puts it, “restrictions of 
activity and social disadvantage are the inevitable and tragic consequences of being 
impaired” (40).  
Too often, however, it is assumed that the medical model of disability, with its 
negative and ableist implications, is broadly characteristic of ‘how things used to be’. The 
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chauvinism of the present leads critics to assume that life for people with disabilities in the 
past was inevitably abject. The characterisation of the medical model as the way in which 
disability was understood in the past simplifies the complexities of historical understandings 
of the body-mind. For example, Thomas suggests that the medical model of disability is 
implicit in “lay, medical, welfarist and other cultural discourses” and it is these “traditional 
ideas” that the newer social model refutes (40). The use of the term “traditional” should alert 
historians to the potential for further enquiry as to the origins and locations of this discourse. 
In fact, one might go so far as to suggest that the word itself is an immediate sign that such 
ideas are in fact historically and culturally contingent, and that some of their ideological 
power is gained by the concealment of their contingency. By examining alternative contexts 
for understanding human difference, the “traditional” status of these notions can be 
dislodged. 
 
Renaissance approaches to disability: Montaigne and Bacon 
 
Certainly, the contributions gathered by this volume belie the notion that there is 
anything resembling a pre-modern “traditional” understanding of disability. Nevertheless, it 
is useful to examine contemporary theorists’ notions of human diversity to see what kinds of 
assumptions are in play. The essays of Michel de Montaigne offer a rich source of this kind 
of evidence. Throughout his writing, Montaigne is constantly reasoning through questions, 
and deducing and inducting principles and truths by considering exempla and propositions. 
This rationalism repeatedly invokes a common-sense notion of the subject, constituted as a 
stable and individualised quality of humanness. Nevertheless, Montaigne periodically feels 
the need to restate the boundaries of subjectivity, even if his tone suggests that such 
distinctions are obvious. For example, in “On Fear” (I.18), he notes that he will “leave aside 
simple folk” in his consideration of the topic, as he characterises their fears as irrational 
superstitions (81-4). Here, Montaigne is making a class-based distinction, but elsewhere he 
considers mental capacity to be a quality potentially independent of social class. For example, 
in the 1580 version of “On the inequality there is between us” (I.42), Montaigne praises 
Epaminondas, a 4th-century Greek general and one of his personal heroes. In noting how 
superior he finds Epaminondas to other men, Montaigne specifies “I mean men in their right 
mind for fools and those made witless by accident are not complete men” (288).  
Montaigne’s argument in “On the inequality there is between us” is that high social 
status does not necessarily indicate superior worthiness. But he leaves intact the assumption 
that some individuals are indeed more deserving. His considerations depend upon the 
presupposition that the differences between humans are firstly innate, and thus expressive of 
something essential about each person, and secondly of different moral and social value and 
thus legitimately hierarchisable. Some souls are better than others, even if worldly hierarchy 
does not always match this merit properly. Since advantages of birth and luck can be ruined 
by folly, however, it is nevertheless the individual’s responsibility to actively intervene in 
their own lives.  
This conclusion is based upon the assumption of a basic set of normative 
characteristics and opportunities. In judging the worth of individuals, Montaigne counsels 
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against being distracted by external, inessential properties like clothing and wealth. His list of 
the questions to ask in this thought experiment conflates physical and moral qualities: 
 
Is his body functioning properly? Is it quick and healthy? What sort of soul does he 
have? Is his soul a beautiful one, able, happily endowed with all her functions?
3
 Are 
her riches her own or are they borrowed? Has luck had nothing to do with it? Does 
she face drawn swords with steady gaze? Does it not bother her whether she expires 
with a sigh or a slit throat? Is she calm, unruffled and contented? That is what we 
need to know; that is what the immense distances between us men should be judged 
by (289-90). 
 
So social inequality is justified, or justifiable, by the different levels of desert of different 
people. The criteria for desert involve physical health and ability, mental fortitude (through 
the acceptance of stoic principles), and independence from worldly advantage. The 
importance of independence is made clear in Montaigne’s counter-example of “the mass of 
men nowadays, senseless, base, servile, unstable […] men totally dependent upon others” 
(290). Ideals of independence elide the necessity of human co-operation (as Tobin Siebers 
has pointed out, human society is essentially “a community of dependent frail bodies that rely 
on others for survival” (Siebers 2008, 182)). Montaigne’s own position in his country retreat 
offers independence from court and thus any society that ‘counts’, supported by the labour of 
servants whose work is excluded from this calculus of dependency. Montaigne’s wealth and 
social position enables him to ignore the inevitability of dependence in human society, and 
thus excludes it from his sense of its place in what makes an admirable man, or by extension, 
any sort of man. 
It is not necessarily the case, however, that Montaigne counts himself above the 
“mass of men nowadays,” that is, sordidly ‘dependent’. He discusses his own experience of 
chronic illness in “On the resemblance of children to their fathers.” Here, Montaigne reflects 
on the way that chronic pain has changed his understanding of what constitutes a life worth 
living. Inheriting his father’s disposition to kidney stones was one of Montaigne’s worst fears 
as a younger man, and he describes as his youthful support for euthanasia in such cases: “I 
declared that life should be amputated at the point where it is alive and healthy” (859). But 
once the dreaded outcome has come to pass, and Montaigne starts to experience frequent 
painful attacks, he finds that “after about eighteen months in this distasteful state, I have 
already learnt how to get used to it. I have made a compact with this colical style of life; I can 
find sources of hope and consolation in it” (859). He reports that he had thought that his 
“bodily sufferings” would be “so unbearable that in truth my fear of them exceeded the 
suffering they now cause me” (860). He no longer approves of the legendary Tamburlaine’s 
practice of executing lepers to free them from suffering, wryly commenting “any of them 
would rather have been thrice a leper than to cease to be” (859). Montaigne thus comes to 
recognise the importance of subjective experience over the assumptions of normativity. 
One of the chief problems with ill-health, it seems, is doctors. Montaigne declares that 
even in his worst moments “a man can still find things bearable if his soul has cast off the 
                                                 
3
 The pronouns in this passage follow the feminine gendering of ‘soul’ (âme) in the French original.  
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weight of the fear of dying and the weight of all the warning threats, inferences and 
complications which Medicine stuffs into our heads” (860). This is surely tongue-in-cheek, 
but Montaigne’s intense scepticism of the medical profession is of a piece with his 
valorisation of independence. Montaigne prefers folk remedies and those recorded in 
Classical sources above those of contemporary medical practitioners. He would rather deal 
with his illness himself than let ‘experts’ interfere. The responsibility is upon the learned 
individual, with sufficient wealth and leisure time to do so, to treat themselves according to 
their own knowledge of medical literature and practice, and if that fails, to make their own 
reconciliation with chronic illness and death. 
We might have expected Montaigne to deal further with the topic of disability in his 
essay “On the lameˮ (III.11) but, despite what the title would seem to suggest, this essay is 
mostly about the nature of knowledge and experience. The idea of lameness is merely 
brought in as an example of the way that commonly-held beliefs (in this case, the notion that 
lame women are better sexual partners) have the tendency to be confirmed by experience 
merely because they are believed, and not because experience actually backs them up. 
Montaigne’s interest in disability is a subset of his interest in the variety of human 
experience. Indeed, the second book of Essays ends with the declaration that “the most 
general style followed by Nature is variety”, which accords with Snyder’s sense that 
Montaigne has a broadly positive attitude towards difference (2002, 194), particularly when, 
earlier in the volume, he declares that “what we call monsters are not so for God” (808, also 
cited in Snyder).  
The benign curiosity that seems to motivate the essays and their exploration of this 
variety is not necessarily consistently benevolent from a disability perspective, however, as is 
demonstrated by Montaigne’s reflections “On physiognomy” (III.12). Here, he draws a 
distinction between “surface ugliness”, such as facial blemishes where “the limbs are well-
proportioned and whole” and what he terms “the other kind, which is strictly speaking 
deformity”. Deformity, according to Montaigne “is more substantial and more inclined to 
turn its effects inwards” (1198-99). Thus, the differentiation between outward show and inner 
essential qualities is invoked to assert a correspondence between them, which might form the 
basis of the judgements of a person’s relative worthiness that Montaigne outlined in his 
justification of inequality.  
The logical possibilities of this correspondence are explored more fully by 
Montaigne’s fellow essayist, Francis Bacon in his essay “Of Deformity”. Bacon focuses on 
physical imperfections and their relationship to personality and action, establishing a duality 
of body and mind. Bacon asserts that there is a balance between body and mind such that 
“where Nature erreth in the One, she ventureth in the Other” (2000, 133). That is, a deficient 
body is compensated for by a superlative mind. Thus far, Bacon seems to subscribe to 
compensatory model of disability, suggesting that it is a form of deficit which is a 
quantifiable deviation from the norm that can be matched by a hyper-ability in an alternative 
mode. Bacon’s implied norm, therefore, rather than constituting a binary opposition to deficit, 
seems more like the state in the middle of an Aristotelian tripartite model where the centre 
balances between two poles of excess and deficit.  
Bacon stresses the importance of volition in what the individual makes of these gifts, 
claiming “there is in Man, an Election touching the Frame of his Minde, and a Necessity in 
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the Frame of his Body” (133). The body, it seems, is fixed, but the mind can, through 
“Discipline”, be shaped. Deformity, Bacon concludes, is not a sign of a person’s character, 
then, rather it is a factor which invariably shapes it in particular ways. In this sense, Bacon 
seems aware of a sort of proto-social model of disability, when he describes the social 
opprobrium directed towards those with noticeably different bodies: “Whosoever hath any 
Thing fixed in his Person, that doth enduce Contempt, hath also a perpetuall Spurre in 
himselfe, to rescue and deliver himself from Scorne” (134). Such experiences, Bacon asserts, 
means that, eventually “all Deformed Persons are extreme Bold” (134). This shared life 
experience operates as a kind of determinism, meaning that those with visible deformities are 
highly motivated and cunning. Furthermore, Bacon suggests that their social aspirations 
benefit from others’ low expectations, to the point where he urges that when combined with 
“great Wit”, i.e. intelligence, “Deformity is an Advantage to Rising” (134). 
Bacon’s view of disability is thus framed within an explicitly hierarchised context 
where disability might be expected to hinder social advancement, along the lines of 
Montaigne’s valorisation of the “able” body and soul. Bacon’s concern about the unexpected 
advancement of those considered verges into paranoia as he compares the position of the 
‘deformed’ social climber to that of the eunuchs who earned the trust of ancient kings by 
being indiscriminately obnoxious to everyone. Bacon assumes that the eunuchs envy those 
who are not eunuchs, and analogously suggests that the ‘deformed’ persons he speaks of are 
similarly bitter and envious. These negative traits mean that ancient kings valued the 
eunuchs’s consequent qualities as “good Spialls, and good Whisperers”, that is, spies and 
intriguers. Bacon explicitly states “much like is the Reason of Deformed Persons” (134). 
Bacon ends the essay with an acknowledgement that the social pressures he describes 
might spur ‘deformed’ persons to become “Excellent” rather than duplicitous, and even 
provides a list of such worthies (including Aesop and Socrates). But though Bacon 
acknowledges a social component of disability, he does not consider this either worthy of 
challenge or capable of changing. Bacon’s argument seems to be that, far from being 
disadvantageous, disability can provide an individual with the motivation to prove detractors 
wrong. Bacon’s ideas thus prefigure later formulations of both the “supercrip” and the 
diabolical villain - stereotypical disablist fantasies that enact the erasure of disability from 
humanity.  
Both Bacon and Montaigne situate disabled individuals well outside the realm of the 
subject, even as they recognize the roles that disabled individuals can play in society and, in 
Montaigne’s case, acknowledge the frailty of their own physical embodiment and its effect on 
their perception and experience. Their understanding of human difference is fundamentally 
shaped by an implicit belief that humans are unequal. So although difference may well have 
been read in radically different ways in the past, ‘disability’ remains an operative category in 
the history of exclusion and the naturalising of inequality. Disability as a category has thus 
metamorphosed considerably over time and yet remains recognisable. As Snyder points out, 
“disability studies offers a platform and an interdisciplinary arena for the analysis of social 
meanings ascribed to variations across bodily and cognitive forms” (2002, 193-4).  
Disability scholarship is thus needed to clarify this fundamental aspect of social meaning in 
the Renaissance period.  
15 
 
 The chapters of this volume make use of an extraordinarily broad range of evidence to 
make early modern disability visible. This includes petitions, corporate records, medical 
texts, autobiography, letters, family papers (and other materials such as bibles), hospital 
records and various other forms of administrative records alongside a wealth of literary 
sources. Disability, in its varied forms, was clearly acknowledged and negotiated as part of 
daily life in the Renaissance, and each chapter in the volume demonstrates some part of the 
range of meanings and constructions attached to specific understandings of disability in the 
Renaissance.  
Simone Chess’s chapter, ‘Atypical Bodies’, considers the dizzying range of normal 
and abnormal bodies depicted in the Renaissance, and the similarly vast range of meanings 
attached to those bodies – were they punishment or miracle; objects of pity, power or 
curiosity; sexualised or isolated; accommodated or valorized? Chess demonstrates that 
approaches to atypicality were fluid and relational, and so have the power to undermine any 
concept of a fixed status of disability (or the body more generally) in the Renaissance. 
Drawing on contemporary ballads and other ephemeral print, Chess shows that Renaissance 
understanding of the ‘monstrous’ body came by combining categories of observation: moral, 
allegorical and anatomical epistemologies were all deployed in contemporary descriptions of 
atypicality. Moreover, those possessed of atypical bodies were often adept at manipulating 
these categories and code-switching to establish and safeguard their own place within society. 
Liam Haydon and Edmond Smith’s chapter, ‘Mobility Impairment’, uses the idea, and 
records, of the early modern corporation to assess the ways in which physical impairment 
was considered as part of the Renaissance labour market. Petitioners to the corporations 
stressed their service and usefulness, as well as their need, and awards were made based on 
the quality of the petitioner, and their perceived willingness to be useful, rather than the need 
or severity of the injury. Mobility impairment came not just from birth, but from injuries in 
war or at work, and this chapter addresses the cultural manifestations of these acquired 
disabilities, as well as the social structures put in place to support those who were affected, 
their families and communities.  
Adleen Crapo’s chapter, ‘Pain’, notes that everyday pain (whether physical or 
emotional) can be difficult to make visible, and so concentrates on moments of public and/or 
spectacular pain in executions, torture and medical works. Where pain is made public, it is 
used to create a sense of interiority, with the afflictions of the body used to create and 
examine a sense of self, for example as a troubled sufferer, a voyager in search of a cure, or a 
spiritual penitent. Reformation attitudes to the idea of suffering pain as a spiritual journey (as 
an imitation of Christ) were complex, with Calvin counselling his followers neither to seek 
out pain nor avoid it if it manifested itself. At the same time, methods of judicial torture 
developed in the latter part of the Renaissance emphasised the criminal as a painful or toxic 
part of the body politic, which must be excised. Though sometimes controversial, disciplinary 
pain was an important part of state activity, not least in the spectacle it provided, further 
complicating the relationship between pain, the body and the spiritual self. 
Bianca Frohne’s chapter, ‘Blindness’, provides a series of examples from early 
modern Germany to offer a physiological and cultural overview of visual impairments in the 
Renaissance. She demonstrates the range of meanings that ‘blindness’ carried in early 
modern writings, from divine afflictions which could be equally miraculously healed to a 
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symptom of old age and devoted labour, and in particular notes the ways in which blind 
people were able to continue work (of various kinds). Taking an intersectional approach, 
Frohne considers the interaction between blindness and other social categories such as 
gender, class, age and education. What it meant to be ‘blind’ in the Renaissance often 
depended on those intersections, making blindness much more a cultural construct than a 
specific physical ailment. 
Jennifer Nelson’s chapter, ‘Deafness’, examines Renaissance deafness through the 
prism of ‘Deaf Gain’, challenging the idea that loss of hearing, with its cultural or cognitive 
gains is indeed a kind of ‘loss’. Such gains are personally and historically contingent, but 
Nelson finds that in the Renaissance they clustered around the ability to shut out the world 
(selectively or otherwise). However, since Renaissance society privileged the power of 
spoken language, most of the representations of deafness – and the gains made from it – are 
temporary or performative, with the permanently deaf excluded both from society and its 
representations (in literature or the archive). Consequently, the power to stop one’s ears 
became an elective defence against the potentially poisonous or corrupting words of others. 
Susan Anderson’s chapter, ‘Speech’, further considers the Renaissance as a culture 
which valorised the spoken word. Anderson considers a range of theological, rhetorical, 
medical and legal contexts which show how particular modes of speech were effectively 
linked to understandings of personhood in the period. In the last part of the chapter, Anderson 
considers dramatic representations of non-normative speech as a key source for 
understanding the relationship between speech and identity in the cultural imagination of the 
Renaissance.  
Emily Lathrop’s chapter, ‘Learning Difficulties’, summarises the myriad ways in 
which difficulties in learning intersected with other social groupings, particularly the major 
Abrahamic religions. Lathrop shows that these religions generally advocate respect and 
inclusion for those with learning difficulties, though this can be at the cost of denying certain 
privileges, or full membership of society. Lathrop also explores the legal and medical 
understanding of learning disabilities, and the slippage between such difficulties and the more 
generalised ‘madness’. In doing so, she shows how learning disabilities – and associated 
conditions such as passivity or stupidity – were used to justify social relations, particularly in 
guardianship arrangements and as a legal justification for the conquest of the New World.  
Sonya Freeman Loftis’s chapter, ‘Mental Health Issues’, demonstrates the various 
ways in which Renaissance madness was situated as something beyond the reach of 
contemporary interpretative models, either because of a scarcity of symptoms and causes, or 
an excess of them. Even the terminology of madness (“idiot”, “fool”, “distracted”, 
“melancholic” and “lunatic” all circulated freely alongside “mad”) reveals the range of 
meanings and understandings ascribed to mental illness. Loftis shows how such conditions 
were socially constructed, in both diagnosis and treatment(s). In particular, her focus on the 
association between madness and melancholy reveals the moral, spiritual and supernatural 
associations of madness. Her chapter closes with an examination of the Bethlem Hospital, a 
rare source of records on madness, which demonstrates the ways in which the hospital 
conceived of itself as a curing institution, though very little actual treatment was offered to 
prisoners, who became instead sources of entertainment for visitors.  
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The range of topics and approaches presented by this volume provides a starting point 
for further investigation into the complexities of Renaissance understandings and experiences 
of disability and its relationship to identity, the body-mind, physical labour, ageing, 
spirituality, justice and sexuality. Siebers argues that “being human guarantees that all other 
identities will eventually come into contact with some form of disability identity” (2008, 5); 
concomitantly, all other cultural formations and constructions will, too, intersect with 
disability eventually. It is clear that there is no singular mode of experiencing or 
understanding disability in the period, but this volume demonstrates some of the possible 
ways of thinking, living and being in the Renaissance which have relevance for our 
understanding of disability now.  
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